Recently, alongside growing threats in Georgia, the role of the security sector is also increasing. It is becoming important to know what kind of security system we want—Soviet or Western?
Against the backdrop of ongoing active political processes, a number of circumstances are emerging that clearly indicate the country's distancing from the Western world. At the same time, considering the anti-Western narratives highlighted in the 2024 report of the State Security Service (SSS), one of the key agencies responsible for the country’s security, it is easy to deduce the direction in which this agency will develop in the near future (if given the opportunity) and what issues it will focus on resolving under the pretext of ensuring the country’s security.
Let us consider what kind of prospects we face and what we lose in the field that serves as the foundation for ensuring the country’s security in the event of complications or a complete breakdown in relations with Western partners within the systems of special services.
In democratic states, special services are value-based structures and are involved in the state governance process. The values on which their activities are based include the rule of law, protection of human rights, and institutional transparency. These values ensure control over processes and the development of special services. The Western system inherently creates a reality where security organizations do not participate in the persecution of various groups or in political score-settling. The goal of political impartiality is to maintain public trust in the system. In the West, special services operate in accordance with societal interests, which is reflected in a high level of accountability. In Western countries, professionalism is defined by ethical conduct, specialized knowledge, and skills. Compromises regarding personal and professional standards are minimized. Career progression is clearly established, and human resource development is driven by research and evaluations. A system of values operates, with key principles including respect for human rights, objectivity, accountability, targeted use of technical and other resources, combating corruption, and refraining from spreading false information. Rapid technological development is ensured. For Western intelligence and security structures, international cooperation is not merely an option but a necessity, as modern threats require large-scale, close, consistent, and systematic collaboration. Western special services function as part of a security and intelligence network, where the success or failure of one country directly impacts others.
It is important to understand what types of challenges we will face in the Georgian reality if we reach a state where the Western approach and standards disappear from national special services:
- Access to various types and scales of training organized by the special services of Western countries will be restricted, and expert cooperation will weaken. For Georgian special services, training and experience-sharing in areas such as international terrorism, cybersecurity, and modern trends in analytical and operational activities are crucial.
Future personnel will find themselves in an isolated system.
- The flow of information (on terrorism, cyberattacks, regional destabilization) will decrease. We will no longer know what adversaries are planning or what our allies are observing. Special services will turn into a propaganda tool, and national security will be tailored to serve a specific group of individuals.
- The potential for renewing cooperation with Western partners will be lost for a long time. Even if it is restored, there will always be a degree of distrust and the need for increased monitoring from Western partners.
- Isolation from international cooperation networks will occur, leading to the discreditation of the services in the eyes of Western partners and their portrayal as unreliable. It cannot be ruled out that in professional circles, we will be regarded as a source of disinformation. Trust will vanish.
- We will face technological lag and encounter problems in the field of cybersecurity.
- There will be a brain drain of specialists employed in the services. Educated employees with a Western outlook will leave the system, moving to the Western civil sector (if such exists), and it is not ruled out that they may leave the country, increasing the risks of information leaks. The number of loyal but professionally incompetent personnel will rise proportionally. There will be a personnel policy that serves the interests of the ruling power, leading to a decline in professional standards.
- Over time, we will see political loyalty replacing professionalism. This will create issues such as incorrect threat assessments, complicated operations, and the use of intelligence and security systems for political purposes.
- A different culture will emerge within the services, and activities will be based on different values. The risks of nepotism and nihilism will increase, along with opportunities for "adapting" to corruption.
- The process of alienation of Georgian special services from society will deepen, and their employees, especially high-ranking officers or civilians, will become even more captivated by the allure of omnipotence and impunity.
- Over time, Georgian special services will develop an internal structure that serves not the state but narrow partisan interests. The special services will operate against political opponents. The security system will become partisan.
Under these conditions, it is inevitable that Western partners will be replaced by other so-called "partners." Georgian special services will begin to seek for the new "partners," while potential "partners" will create favorable conditions to find common ground with Georgian special services. For example, in the initial stage, it is easily possible to establish regional and multilateral formats under the pretext of combating international terrorism. Additionally, there could be an expansion of cooperation in areas such as illegal migration or addressing border violations. Establishing cooperation in the field of narco-crime, followed by commissioning or jointly executing specific tasks related to the activities of citizens of “partner countries” both on Georgian territory and in other countries; organizing and participating in training sessions to share the expertise of Georgian special services units (operational, technical, and analytical sectors); conducting joint operations and holding bilateral closed meetings, for example, on cybersecurity. The purpose of all this will be to find or deliberately create common points of contact for cooperation, making it significantly more difficult for Georgian special services to exit such cooperation in the future. Additionally, there will inevitably be efforts to select individuals loyal to these partners within the Georgian special services, support their career advancement, and utilize them in the future.
Finally, the topic discussed in the article is not merely a professional issue. The future of Georgia’s security depends on understanding, once and for all, what kind of special services we are building—ones based on values or ones under governmental influence? When we choose influence, security no longer rests on values. It becomes a politicized and centralized structure, technologically outdated. If we abandon values for the sake of influence, we will end up with a system that no longer protects the people but controls them—a system that no longer works for freedom but solely for power.